Term Structure of
The holding return can also be expressed in terms of the yield using equation 1: ( 
3) H,--Rt,-RtI
For some purposes, it is useful to consider the following linearized expression for the holding return:
(4) H, Rp where p is a constant equaling an average long rate. If the long-term interest rate remains unchanged between t and t + 1, the holding return equals the yield. If the long rate rises, the investor realizes a capital loss on the bond, and the holding return is less than the yield. Similarly, if the long rate falls, the investor realizes a capital gain, and the holding return exceeds the yield. a. Defined as R, -r,, where R, is the long rate and r, is the short rate.
b. Excess holding return between long and short bonds, H, -r,, as defined in text.
SUMMARY STATISTICS
The interest rate data I use are from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The short rate is a three-month interest rate, and the long rate is the rate on a long-term government bond. Both interest rates are for the first month of each quarter and are expressed at an annual percentage rate. The period I examine is 1961:1 to 1984:4. 4 The precise description of the data appears in appendix A.
An international comparison of interest rates is useful only to the extent that there is independent variation in rates from one country to another. Table 1 table shows that the level of the three-month interest rate is highly correlated across the four countries, but that the quarterly change is not. Because interest rates gradually drifted up in most countries during this period, the quarterly change correlations are more telling. In most cases, this correlation is below 0.3. The sole exception is the correlation between the United States and Canada, but even here, the correlation is only 0.61. In general, therefore, there appears to be substantial independent movement in interest rates in these four countries. Table 1 also presents the cross-country correlations of the spread between the long rate and the short rate and of the difference in quarterly holding return between the long bond and the short bond. These correlations, generally in the neighborhood of 0.5, show enough independent variation to warrant a comparison of the term structures of the four countries.
During the early 1970s the international financial system shifted from fixed to flexible exchange rates, a change that could affect the extent to which interest rates of different countries move together. If uncovered interest parity holds, then the returns from investing in different countries are equalized in expectation and the difference in nominal yields reflects expected changes in the exchange rate. One might therefore expect nominal interest rates to move more closely together under fixed exchange rates than under flexible exchange rates. Table 2 presents the cross-country correlations of the change in the short rate for three periods between 1960:2 and 1986:2. The second period begins in 1973:1, roughly the time of the change to flexible exchange rates and the beginning of the period of worldwide oil supply shocks. The third period begins in 1979:4, which coincides with the tightening of Federal Reserve policy and the subsequent increase in interest rate volatility. Strikingly, interest rates do not appear to move together any more under fixed than under flexible exchange rates. This apparent failure of interest rate parity may be attributable to capital controls that prevent effective international arbitrage. Table 3 presents sample statistics. In all four countries, the yield curve is normally upward sloping; that is, the long rate typically exceeds the short rate. The standard deviation of the long-short spread is also substantial, however, exceeding 100 basis points in each country. Hence, an "inverted" yield curve, in which case the short rate exceeds the long rate, is not especially unusual in any of these countries. While the four countries are similar in terms of the typical upward slope of the yield curve and the great variability of this slope, they show more variety in the investment performance of long bonds relative to short bonds. In the United States and Canada, long bonds have earned a lower return than short bonds by an average of 3.26 and 1.40 percent, respectively. In the United Kingdom, the two sorts of bonds have earned about the same average return. In Germany, long bonds have outperformed short bonds by an average of 1.47 percent. RECENT 
EXPERIENCE
During the 1980s, when both long-term and short-term interest rates rose to historic levels in the United States and elsewhere, many observers believed the relation between the two had departed from earlier experience. Here I take an explicitly empirical and somewhat ad hoc approach to examining fluctuations in the yield curve during the 1980s to address the question of whether, given the observed path of short-term interest rates, the term structure has behaved unusually. The exercise is one of conditional forecasting. I construct a forecast of the long-term interest rate conditional on the realized path of the short-term interest rate. If, because of special developments such as a new regime in the conduct of monetary policy or the prospect of huge U.S. budget deficits, long rates have been affected in a way not captured by the behavior of short rates, this conditional forecast should not be accurate. For example, if the prospect of continued federal budget deficits raised the long rate in the United States disproportionately, then this conditional forecast should underpredict the spread between long rates and short rates during the early 1980s.
The equation estimated is (5) Rt -rt= xo + xt (rt -rt-1) + Ox2(rt l -rt_2) + x3 (Rt-I -rt-1).
The spread is related to recent changes in the short rate and the lagged spread. Equation 5 is similar to that found in large-scale macroeconometric models, but perhaps a bit simpler. It implies that the long rate is a long distributed lag of short rates, in which the weights sum to unity. When equation 5 is estimated with data from 1960:3 to 1979:3, the results, which appear in table 4, are surprisingly similar across countries. In each country, a 100 basis point increase in the short rate causes a reduction in the spread of about 70 basis points. The coefficient on the lagged spread of about 0.9 implies that the spread will revert to its mean within a few years. For example, the U.S. equation implies that a permanent 100 basis point increase in the short rate has the following effect on the long rate: Equation 5 can also be used dynamically to forecast the spread from 1980:1 through 1986:2, using the actual path of the short-term rate. For Germany and especially the United Kingdom, the spread is forecast even less accurately. In both countries, the actual spread is much lower than one would forecast on the basis of short rates alone.
This exercise shows clearly that there are substantial fluctuations in the long-term interest rate that cannot be explained by movements in the short-term interest rate alone. takes little account of factors, such as the policy environment, that shape investors' expectations, which in turn are crucial to the determination of the long rate.6 In the remainder of this paper, therefore, I examine hypotheses tied more closely to economic theory in an attempt to shed light on the determinants of the term structure.
The Expectations Theory of the Term Structure
In this section I examine the expectations theory of the term structure. To anticipate the results, the data for all four countries appear inconsistent with the theory. In particular, the spread between the long-term interest rate and the short-term interest rate is positively related to the subsequent excess return on the long-term bond. In appendix B, I discuss whether measurement error can plausibly explain this finding and conclude that it probably cannot.
Define the term premium as the expected difference between the holding return on a long bond and the holding return on a short bond. That is, where Et represents the expectation conditional on information available at time t. The term premium represents the extra return expected for holding the long-term asset rather than the short-term asset. It is instructive to write equation 6 in terms of yields using equation 4. Simple rearrangement shows that ( 
7)
Rt-rtR)(EtRt+p-Rt)p + Ot.
The spread between the long rate and the short rate reflects both the expected change in the long rate and the term premium. If the expectation is removed from equation 6, the difference between the actual holding returns can be written as the sum of the term premium and the expectation error. and tests the null hypothesis that X = 0. The theory thus provides a large array of potential tests. Indeed, there is almost no end to the list of variables that can be tried on the right-hand side of equation 11 in an attempt to invalidate the theory. One should thus be wary when interpreting any reported rejection. Given a sufficient number of attempts, some variable is bound to produce a "significant" rejection. Of course, a finding attributable to such data mining is not truly significant; instead, the t-statistics should be discounted according to the number of unsuccessful attempts at rejecting the theory.
Perhaps a better strategy is to limit the number of tests of the theory. In particular, one might limit the number of candidate Xt variables to those that, if the expectations theory were false, might reasonably be expected to forecast excess returns. This test is not fundamentally different from that discussed in the previous section. Suppose the regression of the change in the long rate on the spread produces a coefficient significantly different from p, the mean long rate. In this case, the spread provides the wrong forecast about the change in the long rate. Using equation 4, one can infer that the spread forecasts excess holding returns. Estimating equation 12 provides no more information than the regression using holding returns; it merely provides another way to interpret those results.
It is common to write the expectations theory as a relation between the current long rate and expected short rates. This relation can be simply derived. Note first that equation 12 implies When the spread is great, future short rates should on average be above the current short rate.
There is no simple and precise test of this implication. As a crude test of whether the spread reflects expected changes in the short rate, I estimate That is, when the yield curve is steeply sloped, the short rate should on average rise.
RESULTS
As discussed above, one implication of the expectations theory is that the excess holding return, Ht -rt, is serially uncorrelated. The first five autocorrelations appear in table 6. There appears to be no systematic serial correlation. Most of the estimated autocorrelations are insignificant, and there is no consistent pattern across the four countries. Perhaps the only evidence against the expectations theory in table 6 is the firstorder serial correlation in the German data, for which the t-statistic is 2.3. Sin-ce this finding is not repeated in the other countries, it may represent merely random sampling variation. It is probably fair to conclude that the expectations theory passes this first test.
In the second test discussed above, a regression of the excess holding return on the spread between the long rate and the short rate, the expectations theory does not perform as well, as reported in table 7. For all four countries, there is a positive coefficient on the spread. For the United States and Canada, the relation is statistically significant; for the United Kingdom and Germany, the t-statistic is only slightly larger than 1. It is noteworthy, however, that this finding is robust. Contrary to the expectations theory, it appears that there is a positive relation between the long-short spread and the subsequent excess holding return. Again, there appears to be a significant relation between the spread and the subsequent excess holding return. The estimated coefficients in table 7 and in the above regression are substantial. A 1 percentage point increase in the spread between the long rate and the short rate raises the predicted excess return by more than 1 percentage point in each country. Given that the standard deviation of the spread is large (about 150 basis points), these regressions indicate substantial variation in the term premium. The failure of the expectations theory can also be expressed in terms of the yield on long-term bonds. As equation 12 demonstrates, the spread should signal changes in the long rate. Table 8 presents the regression of the change in the long rate on the spread. Instead of the expected coefficient of p : 0.02, the coefficient is consistently negative, although not always significantly so. To the extent that the yield curve forecasts changes in the long rate, it does so in the direction opposite to that predicted by the expectations theory. 10
These results suggest a naive investment strategy. When the long rate is unusually high relative to the short rate, one should buy long bonds. Not only is the coupon yield on the long bond higher than the short rate, but since long rates will on average fall, one should expect a capital gain as well. Conversely, when the long rate is low relative to the short rate, one should buy short bonds.
The implied investment strategy is by no means risk-free, however, as the small R2 that borrowing at the short rate and investing at the long rate produce an expected profit of 9.8 percentage points (annual rate), with a standard deviation of 20.4 percentage points. Hence, a position of $1,000 yields an expected return of about $24.50 after three months (not including transactions costs), with a standard deviation of $51.00. Assuming the return is approximately normally distributed, the probability that this strategy actually produces a loss is about 32 percent. There is no easy money to be made.
While the yield curve does not conform to the expectations theory in its forecast of change in the long rate, its forecast of change in the short rate is consistent with the theory.11 Table 9 presents the results of regressing the change in the short rate on the spread. As the theory suggests, a large spread portends increases in the short rate in each of the four countries.
Explaining the Term Premium
Contrary to the expectations theory, the spread between the long rate and the short rate appears to forecast the excess holding return on longterm bonds. If the assumption of rational expectations is maintained, this finding implies that the term premium varies through time and is positively correlated with this spread.
Of course, to say that the term premium is time-varying is to say no more than that the expectations theory of the term structure fails. Without an explicit theory of the term premium, it is not clear how to make use of this finding. The next step is therefore to seek an explanation for the variation in the term premium.
RISK AS AN OMITTED VARIABLE
Perhaps the most natural explanation of the term premium is that it represents the extrareturn necessary to compensate investors forbearing the extra risk associated with long-term bonds. (As discussed later, the term premium could in principle be negative, in which case investors require compensation for holding short-term bonds.) In this section, I consider various measures of risk to see whether they can help explain the apparent variation in the term premium.
Let RISK be some measure of the risk associated with holding a longterm bond. It is natural to posit that the term premium is positively related to RISK. That is, One would expect that fluctuations in RISK would also be reflected in the spread between the long rate and the short rate, implying that the spread would forecast excess holding returns. In principle, therefore, the hypothesis that there are substantial fluctuations in perceived risk could explain the rejection of the expectations theory reported above.
If RISK were observable, it would be natural to test this hypothesis by estimating the following regression: The hypothesis predicts that the coefficient on the spread is greater than zero. That is, the long bond is risky when the yield curve is steeply sloped.
Unfortunately, RISK is not observable. We can, however, obtain imperfect proxies for it. Measurement error in RISK will bias the estimates of equation 19 but will not bias the estimates of equation 20 as long as the measurement error is uncorrelated with the spread. For this reason, I restrict my attention to this second implication of the risk hypothesis.
INTEREST RATE VOLATILITY
Holding a short-term bond for one period produces a risk-free nominal return. By contrast, holding a long-term bond for one period produces a highly risky return, since the capital gain depends on the next period's price, Pt+ , or, equivalently, on the next period's long rate, Rt + . The more volatile the long rate, the more risky is the long-term bond. If investors are risk averse, they should require a greater expected return to hold long-term bonds when they are riskier. One might therefore expect greater interest rate volatility to be associated with a greater term premium. 12 A casual examination of the sample statistics in table 3 lends some plausibility to the volatility hypothesis. The standard deviation of the excess holding return is smallest in the United States and greatest in the United Kingdom. As this hypothesis predicts, the average long-short spread is also smallest in the United States and greatest in the United Kingdom. We also see in table 3 
RISKt c' Et (VOLe).
If expected volatility were observable, then the tests could proceed as discussed above. Any test of this volatility hypothesis must take into account the fact that expected volatility is not directly observable. Actual volatility, however, is observable and can be viewed as an imperfect proxy for expected volatility. The rational expectations hypothesis implies that the measurement error-the difference between actual and expected volatility-is uncorrelated with the spread at time t.
I therefore test the volatility hypothesis by examining the relation between the long-short spread and actual volatility. I estimate (24) VOLt = a + a (Rt -rt).
If the spread is proxying for expected volatility, then it should be positively related to actual volatility. Hence, the volatility hypothesis predicts that 3 is greater than zero. 13 13. Note, however, that there will be much variation in actual volatility that is not forecastable. Hence, the R2 in this regression is not expected to be large. One can think of this regression as implicitly separating the time series into two subsamples, one in which the yield curve is steeply sloped and another in which the yield curve is relatively flat or negatively sloped. According to the volatility hypothesis, volatility should on average be greater in the first subsample; this test is essentially equivalent to the test that 3 > 0 in equation 24.
The results for this test appear in table 10. Contrary to the volatility hypothesis, the spread does not appear positively related to actual volatility. For three of the four countries-including Germany, the only country for which the coefficient is statistically significant-the coefficient is negative. There is thus no evidence in these data that a steeply sloped yield curve portends volatile bond prices.
The results in table 10 use only the time series variation in the yield curve. As already discussed, it is possible to use the cross-country variation as well by pooling the data. When I estimate equation 24 with the pooled data, using a generalized least squares correction for the cross-country correlations, I obtain According to finance theory, the relevant measure of the risk of an asset is its nondiversifiable, or systematic, risk. To the extent that an asset's risk is diversifiable, an investor does not require a greater return to hold that asset. The apparent failure of the volatility hypothesis may be attributable to the fact that it does not distinguish between diversifiable and nondiversifiable risk.
Much recent work has used the consumption-based capital asset pricing model to link product markets and financial markets.14 The consumption CAPM implies that the expected excess return on an asset depends on its covariability with consumption growth. In particular, it tion through permanent income, implying a negative consumption beta for long bonds. On the other hand, increases in government purchases, to be followed by tax increases, might increase interest rates while reducing consumption, implying a positive consumption beta. Increases in inflation would probably raise nominal interest rates without having any major effect on consumption. There is thus no obvious presumption regarding the size or sign of the consumption covariance. If the source of the shocks changes, this theory predicts that the consumption covariance and thus the term premium will change as well.
The testing strategy I propose for this consumption beta model parallels that for the volatility hypothesis. Define the actual consumption covariability as According to this model, the spread forecasts the excess holding return because it is proxying for variation in the consumption beta. I estimate the following regression:
(29) ccovt = a + a (Rt -rt).
If variation in the consumption beta explains the variation in the term premium reported above, then 3 in equation 29 should be greater than zero. The model has a more specific prediction, however. Since an increase in the spread raises the expected excess holding return by a factor of about 2, the model predicts 3 is about 2/A, where A is again the coefficient of relative risk aversion. Note, however, that because all the data, including consumption growth rates, are measured at a percentage annual rate, a coefficient of 800/A should be expected. Since the coefficient of relative risk aversion is usually thought to be between 0.5 and 8, the theory predicts a coefficient between 100 and 1,600.
16. My use of the sample mean does not take account of variation in the conditional mean of the excess return and consumption growth. Since the predictability (R2) of these two variables is small, this approximation is probably very accurate. The results appear in table 11. For each country, the estimated coefficient is negative and for some significantly so. The hypothesis that the coefficient is in the reasonable range is always rejected. The pooled regression produces the same conclusion:
(30) ccovit = 42.8 -24.2 (Rit -rit) (13.1) (7.0) Contrary to the theory, there is a significant negative relation between the spread and consumption covariability. Variation in the consumption beta therefore cannot explain the apparent variation in the term premium documented above.
COVARIABILITY WITH THE STOCK MARKET
While the consumption CAPM is appealing in its integration of the consumption decision and the portfolio allocation decision, an older tradition in finance suggests using the covariance with the market return as the appropriate measure of risk. One can view the consumption CAPM as using consumption growth as the ideal proxy for the market return: individuals increase consumption when the return on all their assets, including human capital, has been above normal and decrease their consumption when the return has been below normal. The apparent failure of the consumption CAPM to explain the variation in the term premium, however, leaves open the question of whether some other measure of the market return can more successfully shed light on the term strticture.
Perhaps the most standard measure of risk uses the return on the stock market as the market return. Matthew Shapiro and I examined the return on a cross-section of 464 stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange. We found that the covariance with the Standard and Poor's index is more related to average return than is the covariance with consumption growth.17 That is, stocks appear to be priced using the more standard market beta rather than the consumption beta. This finding suggests that the covariability of return with a stock market index may better explain fluctuations in the term structure as well.
One possible argument for the use of the market covariance is that the stock market may provide a better measure of the consumption changes of the typical investor than does aggregate consumption. To the extent that aggregate consumption is dominated by individuals who are liquidity constrained, the empirical implementation of the consumption CAPM is called into question. One can view the standard capital asset pricing model as essentially using the stock market index as a proxy for the consumption of the typical investor.
With this interpretation, it is natural to repeat the above test using a stock market index in the place of retail sales. In particular, I replace consumption growth in equation 27 with the excess return on the stock market. The test then proceeds as before. Table 12 contains the results of regressing the actual market covariability (mcov) on the spread. Perhaps the most salient feature of these results is the large standard errors; in no country is the coefficient statistically significant. In three of the four countries, the coefficient is positive, however, and the hypothesis that it is in the plausible range 17. Mankiw and Shapiro, "Risk and Return." cannot be rejected. The pooled regression, which uses both the time series variation and cross-country variation in the data, produces the following: Again, the coefficient is not at all significant. Yet the standard error is so large that the hypothesis that it is close to the plausible range cannot be rejected. Note, however, that the hypothesis that the coefficient is above 60 can be rejected. Since the coefficient equals 800/A according to the theory, the hypothesis that the coefficient of a relative risk aversion is less than 13 can also be rejected. Hence, variation in the market beta can explain the term premium only if the coefficient of relative risk aversion is very large.
CHANGES IN ASSET SUPPLIES
It is often claimed that a change in the relative supply of short-term and long-term bonds can affect the relative return on these assets, that is, the term premium. The maturity structure of the debt of the United States has changed substantially since World War II: the average maturity was ninety-eight months in 1950, gradually fell to thirty-two months in 1975, and then rose to forty-five months in 1980.18 Such changes can in principle explain fluctuations in the term premium.
While changes in asset supplies might affect the term premium, it is unlikely that they can fully explain the changing term premium implied by the regressions in table 7. First, since the standard deviation of the spread exceeds 150 basis points and the coefficient on the spread is about 2, these regressions imply that the standard deviation of the term premium exceeds 300 basis points. Yet available estimates imply that asset supplies cannot have that great an effect. Using data from 1960 to 1980, Benjamin Friedman estimates that a$ 100 billion shift in government debt from short to long bonds increases the term premium by only 16 basis points. 19 (In 1970, the middle of this period, the total privately held debt was only $217 billion.) Jeffrey Frankel estimates even smaller effects of debt management.20 Second, the maturity structure of the debt changes only gradually. It does not change greatly quarter to quarter or year to year. In contrast, the term premium implied by the results in table 7 fluctuates more quickly. In particular, the eighth autocorrelation of the spread is only slightly larger than zero, implying that a high value of the term premium today does not convey much information on the term premium in eight quarters. If the maturity structure of the public debt were the primary cause of the fluctuating term premium, the term premium would be much more highly serially correlated.
Hence, it appears that the term premium is too volatile and not sufficiently serially correlated to be easily explained by fluctuations in the relative supply of long and short bonds. Table B-I presents the regressions from table 7 reestimated with this instrumental variables procedure. The coefficient on the spread remains positive in each case, although usually somewhat smaller. Also in each case the standard error is larger, so the null hypothesis that the coefficient is zero cannot be rejected. While these results are not sufficiently strong to rule out the measurement error hypothesis, neither do they point to measurement error as a likely candidate to explain the failure of the expectations theory reported above.
Conclusion
A second way to gauge the practical importance of measurement error is to calculate directly how much error is necessary to generate the coefficients reported in table 7. Assume that the short rate is measured accurately and that the long rate is subject to measurement error, E, that 
Comments and Discussion
Stephen M. Goldfeld: Gregory Mankiw has provided us with an informative paper on the term structure of interest rates, a time-honored topic that has been the source of an extraordinary amount of empirical work. One prominent use of term structure equations is in macroeconometric models, a stylized version of which would include the short-term interest rate in the money demand and supply equations and the long-term interest rate as a component of the cost of capital in the investment equations. A term structure equation then permits the model to be "closed." Indeed, some models have term structure equations for both government securities and various types of private securities, with what might be called risk-structure equations bridging the gap between alternative types of securities of the same maturity.
At a more substantive level, investigations of the term structure have served as a testing ground for theories of expectations formation and asset pricing. While some studies have examined surveys of explicit interest rate forecasts, more typically the mechanism for expectations formation is analyzed only indirectly. There are a variety of approaches to asset pricing-including the capital asset pricing model, arbitrage pricing, and demand-supply models-but the so-called expectations theory has received the most attention. It is now generally agreed, however, that much of the early work on testing the expectations theory was flawed, largely because of the failure to specify properly exactly what was being tested. Current practice, which identifies the expectations theory with the joint hypotheses of constant term premiums and rational expectations, has permitted more precise tests of the theory.
Mankiw's paper is squarely in this modern tradition, and he finds that the expectations theory does not stand up to close scrutiny. Of course, 97 even before this paper there was a growing literature, to which Mankiw and my fellow discussant Robert J. Shiller have contributed, suggesting that the expectations theory cannot be fully reconciled with the data. What is new about the present paper is the multicountry emphasis and the careful examination of the roles of risk and measurement error to attempt to explain the formal rejection of the theory.
Mankiw begins by examining the data for four countries, noting that there are substantial divergences in interest rate movements, so that there is likely to be a payoff to a multicountry study. He further notes that there are dramatic differences across countries in the relative investment performance of long-and short-term securities. Unfortunately, this interesting observation is not explored. Rather, Mankiw turns to a set of ad hoc term structure equations to examine the question of whether post-1979 interest rate experience has been unusual. I am somewhat unsure what to make of this exercise and Mankiw seems a bit ambivalent as well. For the United States and Canada, except for the most recent period, the equations seem to extrapolate reasonably well. For the United Kingdom and Germany the equations clearly drift off. While this is certainly evidence of a problem, the use of dynamic simulation may, at least visually, overstate the instability.' A more explicit test of stability might help clarify the issue. In any event, something has gone wrong, and Mankiw concludes from this and from the fact that such equations should in principle be unstable in the face of regime shifts, that models that are theoretically more sound should be tested.
Mankiw's basic test of the expectations theory relies on the observation that, under the maintained hypotheses, the excess holding return should not be forecastable. Putting it in this negative way leads to an embarrassing number of tests of the theory, since any variable can potentially be used to forecast the excess holding return. To keep things manageable, Mankiw restricts attention to the lagged excess holding period return and the spread between the long and short rates. The theory passes the first test but fails the second, in that the spread yields a positive coefficient in all four countries, and significantly so for two of them. A related test that regresses the change in the long rate on the spread yields qualitatively similar results.
In carrying out these tests, Mankiw makes a number of simplifying assumptions. First, he calculates the holding return on the assumption that the long-term bond is a consol. Second, he uses a linearity assumption in performing his long-rate test. (Had the linearity assumption been used to calculate holding returns, this second test would have been identical to his basic test.) Third, he ignores the post-1979 increase in interest rate variability, which probably introduces some heteroscedasticity into his estimating equations. While these simplifying assumptions could affect his test statistics, evidence from other studies that have avoided the assumptions suggests that his conclusions are likely to be robust to variations in these assumptions.
There are two other aspects of his tests for which the consequences are less clear. First, it is not clear from the description of the data whether, except for the United Kingdom, the implicit maturity of the long-term rates is constant. If not, the tests could be picking up the timevarying mixing of constant term premiums rather than reflecting nonconstant term premiums. In other words, rejection of the expectations theory may partly result from the use of inappropriate data. Second, the diverse historical experience cited by Mankiw would seem to warrant the use of country-specific intercepts in pooling the data for the four countries.
Despite these quibbles, it is clear that Mankiw's paper adds to the evidence against the expectations theory. It seems natural to ask whether the form of his rejection of the theory has important economic consequences and whether one can explain why the rejection occurs. Mankiw addresses both of these questions, the first only briefly. As to economic significance, while Mankiw's results suggest there might be money to be made, he points out that the implied investment strategy may be quite risky. This seems to beg the prior question of whether the results yield a straightforward investment strategy that does make money. There are at least two caveats on this score. The first is the issue of transactions costs, which are ignored in Mankiw's calculation. The second stems from the fact that the in-sample behavior of the equations is not sufficient to establish that there is money to be made. Rather, one needs something like rolling estimation and an out-of-sample analysis. It would be interesting to explore the implication of these factors for an investment strategy.
Mankiw pays considerably more attention to the question of why the expectations theory is rejected. One possible explanation that Mankiw considers is that measurement error of long-term rates is responsible for the rejection. He shows that use of instrumental variables renders the spread insignificant in his basic test for all four countries, but he is unwilling to conclude that this explains the results. His reluctance is based on a calculation that suggests that the variance of the measurement error necessary to explain his results is implausibly large. While this calculation is based on sophisticated reasoning, there are some potential loose ends. First, his calculated measurement variance is only an estimate and is therefore itself imprecise. Unfortunately, no estimate of this imprecision is readily available. Second, it would be possible to redo Mankiw's calculation based on some other variable that also caused the rejection of the expectations theory. This would give another reading on the implied measurement error needed to explain the results. As these comments suggest, I have a hunch there may be a bit more to the measurement story than Mankiw suggests, especially since the problem of nonconstant maturities can be interpreted as a measurement error. This notwithstanding, Mankiw's analysis of the measurement issue is to be applauded. Indeed, many empirical studies could benefit from a similar examination.
A second possible explanation of the rejection of the expectations theory is that the theory neglects risk considerations. Maintaining the assumption of rational expectations, the absence of which would also cause rejection of the expectations theory, Mankiw sets out to relate variations in term premiums to risk variables. The exercise is not guided by a precise hypothesis as to the role of risk, but nevertheless strikes me as reasonably and carefully done. Despite considerable effort, however, the punch line is negative, and we are left with no satisfactory explanation of the rejection of the expectations theory. As Mankiw concludes, this leaves an important question on the research agenda.
Robert J. Shiller: The spread, S, between the long-term interest rate, R,, and the short-term interest rate, r, should, by the rational expecta-three-month Treasury bill rate on a yield rather than discount basis and R, is the twenty-year Treasury bond rate. Both series are for the first month of the quarter. Rather than adopt the linearization of equation 2 above, I first computed the yield to maturity that a twenty-year par bond would have if its price were the present value of quarterly coupon payments and principal discounted by the actual future short rates, and defined S* as this yield to maturity minus the current short rate. For these calculations, the short rate in 1986:2 was used for all short rates after 1986:2. The standard deviation of the S* so computed was 2. Notably, in each of three big peaks in short-term interest rates, 1970, 1974, and 1981, St and S* move closely together. The long-term interest rate behaves pretty much like a moving average of short-term interest rates over the preceding few years, plus a constant. Such a moving average turns out to be a pretty good forecast of the average value of the short rate over the succeeding decade or so. After each of the three major interest rate peaks, the short rate dropped substantially in the next few years. The declines in interest rates were followed by subsequent rises, but these rises were a few years more down the road and hence discounted. When the fitted value and residual were included as independent variables in a regression with dependent variable H, -r, both independent variables showed a positive impact on excess returns. Since the fitted value has a much larger variance than the residual, it is primarily the fitted value, the response of long rates to short rates, that accounts for the table 7 results. It is natural to wonder whether part of the problem is that long rates in some sense overreact to short-term interest rates. In a 1984 paper, Mankiw and Lawrence Summers defined a notion of overreaction: that long rates behave in accordance with equation 2 above but with a y that is too small.3 They noted, however, that such overreaction could never explain the wrong sign of the coefficient of the spread in regressions, like that reported in Mankiw's table 8, of the change in the long rate on the spread.
That the coefficient of the spread has the wrong sign in each of the countries reported in table 8 suggests that something simple and understandable is wrong about the expectations model. In my own past research, however, I have found it difficult to describe in intuitive terms just what is wrong about the reaction of long rates to short rates relative to the expectations model in a way that is applicable to all the countries and samples for which the coefficient has the wrong sign. One possible interpretation is that the response of long-term interest rates to short-term interest rates is too smooth.4 A distributed lag regression of long rates on short rates tends to produce a pattern of lag weights that looks too much like a simple exponential decay curve. The exponential decay pattern for distributed lag coefficients seems to apply to a number of sample periods. There should instead generally be a "notch" in the distributed lag at one lag, because of an extrapolative component to short-term interest rates.
With the data in figure 1, a regression We thus have in the latest drop in long rates a drop in the spread that is not explained by an increase in short rates, as is usual.
The latest decline in the spread might be attributed to a sharp decline in the noise term, E, let us say an exogenous change in investor attitudes.
By the parameter values in the scenario described above, the decline in E would have to be unusually large by historical standards. However, we should not apply historical standards to Et at a time when time series properties of interest rates are clearly changing. The recent volatility of interest rates and unusual concern with government deficits may well have increased the variance of E. Psychologists have shown that the variability of attitude change is not constant but is heavily influenced by salient events. The expectations theory of the term structure is no reason not to ascribe most of the recent drop in the spread to capricious public attitude change.
General Discussion
Albert Wojnilower suggested that the relative supplies of new securities of differing maturities ought to be more integrally incorporated into studies of the interest rate term structure. A major objective in the borrowing decisions of the Treasury, the largest issuer of securities in the U.S. market, is to keep the average maturity of the debt approximately constant, with little if any attention paid to the relative cost of borrowing at different maturities. James Tobin interjected that the Treasury has indeed made peculiar choices regarding maturities, in recent years issuing long-term securities at market rates exceeding their own predictions by several hundred basis points. If the Treasury pays no attention to the costs of borrowing at different maturities, Wojnilower continued, it may be unrealistic to expect the purchasers of Treasury securities to perfectly arbitrage expected returns. Mankiw responded that previous work has found relative interest rates to be insensitive to relative asset supplies. Moreover, relative supplies of securities of different maturities change slowly, so that shifts in relative supplies cannot explain short-run variation in the term structure.
William Poole recommended comparing securities of constant duration rather than those of constant maturity. The maturity of a portfolio equals the weighted average of the time remaining until the principal is due, with the weight for each bond equal to the nominal dollar value of the principal. The average duration of a portfolio equals the weighted average of the time remaining until future coupon and principal payments are due, with the weights reflecting the present value of the payments to be made at each date. Hence, duration is responsive to the level of the interest rate. Average duration shrinks when the interest rate rises because more of the present value of the stream of payments associated with a bond becomes concentrated in the first few years.
A number of participants wondered how changes in the institutional environment over time might have affected the structure of interest rates. George Perry was especially interested in the figure in Robert Shiller's discussion. Assuming that investors have accurately forecast changes in the short-term interest rate, he noted, the bottom panel of the figure implies a relatively stable long-term bond premium of about 200 basis points from the early 1950s through 1970, roughly equal returns on long-term and short-term securities during the 1970s, and a premium for holding short-term securities of about 400 basis points during the first half of the 1980s. Neither Mankiw nor his discussants offered any explanation for these long-term shifts in their formal presentations. However, Mankiw noted that the premium for holding long-term rather than short-term securities cannot necessarily be inferred from Shiller's plot; the expectational errors implicit in this plot tend to be serially correlated, so that one big surprise could create the persistent divergence in the figure.
Several participants discussed possible determinants of the term structure that were not included in Mankiw's analysis. Wojnilower mentioned recent institutional changes: the move from fixed to flexible exchange rates; changes in the debt management policy of the Treasury; Tobin added that the term structure could at times reflect different expectations of buyers and sellers, in contrast to the usual rational expectations assumption that all participants use the same information and model of the economy. For example, during the depression, Keynes had conjectured that lenders expected interest rates to rise toward their historical average, while borrowers did not foresee the economic events that would justify such a rise. During the 1970s and early 1980s, lenders may have been so conditioned by a long period of capital losses in bonds that they feared still higher bond prices, while borrowers did not foresee economic events that would justify such high long-term rates. Tobin added that preferred habitats of borrowers and lenders with respect to the maturity of debt might differ for other reasons as well and that these differences might vary through time, contributing to the observed variation in the term structure.
William Branson noted that securities markets were linked internationally and that investors chose not just between long-and short-term rates within one country, but between rates in different countries. An analysis that exploited data from several countries more fully would have to consider the relations among interest rates in different countries, along with the exchange rates linking them.
Tobin noted that the equations in table 7 implied quite different term premiums across countries, with the expected steady-state return from holding a long bond rather than a series of short securities ranging from 114 basis points to 350 basis points. One might well ask why there should be a term premium at all if rates are not changing; in effect, the table 7 equations simply reproduce the average spread between long rates and short rates for the period over which they are estimated, without revealing the underlying reasons for the spread. Beyond the question of why there should be any spread, there is the question of why it should be so different across countries. George von Furstenberg suggested that one explanation might be international differences in tax codes. For example, in Germany capital gains on bonds held six months or longer are tax free, whereas in the United States such gains are taxed at 40 percent of the rate applicable to earned income. Offsetting this, German banks receive a credit against non-interest-bearing reserves equal to 10 percent of their holdings of short-term government securities. This would imply that short-term interest rates should be 10 percent lower than otherwise relative to long-term rates. Wojnilower noted that the yield curves for corporate securities and for municipal bonds are quite different; a careful examination of the differences between these two markets might yield useful insights concerning determinants of the term structure.
Von Furstenberg questioned the comparability of the German data with that for other countries. Until recently, the German government issued no short-term securities and very few long-term securities. The three-month interest rate for Germany is of necessity a commercial paper rate, while that for the other three countries compared by Mankiw is a government security rate. Market quotations for the German longterm government bond rate were not available until the 1970s. It is noteworthy that the three-month Treasury bill rate averages 100 to 150 basis points below the three-month Eurodollar rate, while the German three-month rate used by Mankiw averages above the three-month Euromark rate. This makes it doubtful that Mankiw's series on longand short-term German rates can be compared in a term structure equation. It also makes cross-country comparisons of the term structure equations suspect.
